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Abstract. Despite existing methodologies in the field, most requirements 
engineers are poorly trained to define  security requirements. This is due to a 
considerable lack of security knowledge. Some security ontologies have been 
proposed, but a gap still exists between the two fields of security requirement 
engineering and ontologies. This paper is a survey, it proposes an analysis and a 
typology of existing security ontologies and their use for requirements 
definition.   
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1   Introduction 
Security of Information Systems (IS) has progressively become a very broad research 
field [1]. Security is defined as a discipline which allows one to build reliable systems 
that can face malice, errors or mischief [2]. The domain of IS security also 
encompasses a set of methods, techniques and tools responsible for protecting the 
resources of an IS to ensure information availability, confidentiality, integrity, and 
traceability. A requirement prescribes a property judged necessary for the system; 
security requirements engineering frameworks derive security requirements using  
security-specific concepts, borrowed from security engineering paradigm.  With the 
growing need to implement IT security measures in world-wide corporate 
environments and the growing application scope, a major obstacle, that face ordinary 
analysts and developers using  existing security requirements modeling and analyzing  
frameworks, is the lack of security  knowledge and expertise [3][29]. Ontologies are 
useful for representing and interrelating many types of knowledge [4],[5]. In 2003, 
Marc Donner  argued that too much security terminology is vaguely defined, thus it 
becomes difficult to communicate between colleagues and, worse, confusing to deal 
with the people we try to serve [6]. Since that, many security ontologies have been 
proposed during the last decade.  But there are still questions around these works: 
what are the different security ontologies available nowadays? Do they meet the 
requirements? Do they cover all or some security aspects? Which ontology can I 
choose as an analyst seeking for security knowledge for the definition of  IS 
requirements?  We faced these questions, and concluded that we definitely need a 
 general survey of existing security ontologies. Analysts and researchers may find in 
this paper a road map, an overview of what exists in terms of security ontologies. Our 
main objective is to review, analyze, select, and classify security ontologies, as a 
scope study but with a particular interest in the field of security requirements 
engineering.   The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we explain 
the methodology used in the study. Section 3 includes the survey and classification, 
and Section 4 recalls related works. Finally, Section 5, the conclusion, raises future 
perspectives.  
2   Methodology of research  
To perform this survey, we relied on information retrieval and survey methodologies 
presented in [7,8]. We started by gathering any publication related to ontologies, 
requirements, security and its various aspects. The search was conducted inside the 
relevant and known sources of literature such as ACM libraries, IEEE digital library, 
etc.  About 50 papers were gathered. We performed a first read to get a general idea; 
21 papers were discarded at this stage when they were found to be far away from our 
target objective. A second read was carried out for deeper understanding and analysis 
of concepts and relations between them.  Finally, a qualitative analysis lead us to 
classify them into different families, and we defined a set of criteria allowing us to 
compare the approaches. The result of this comparison is synthesized in Table 1. 
3   Synthesis and Classification 
The framework of our classification is composed of 8 families of security ontologies 
(Fig. 1), described as follows:  
• Beginning security ontologies:  
One of the earliest work (back in the nineties) about merging knowledge base and 
information system management at an early level of development was [9] which 
proposed a language (Telos) and a knowledge base divided into four sub-worlds. 
Mylopoulos et al. note that Telos users can develop models for the purpose of 
security specification. 
• Security taxonomies:  
Taxonomies of security concepts are a common method for sharing security 
knowledge. Avizienis et al. [10] provide a detailed taxonomy that contains 
classes of faults, fault modes, fault tolerance techniques, and verification 
approaches. McDermott  et al. [11] were particularly interested in security flaws.  
• General security ontologies:  
By general ontologies we mean these ontologies which aim at covering all (or 
most) security aspects; Herzog and colleagues [12] endeavored to deliver an 
extensible ontology that includes both general concepts and specific vocabulary 
of the domain. In the same vein, Fenz and Ekelhart [13] have proposed an 
ontology that has a similar goal but attempts to cover non-core concepts such as 
the infrastructure of organizations.  
  
Fig. 1. Classification of Security Ontologies into 8 families. 
• Specific security ontologies:  
This category gathers the security ontologies dedicated to a specific domain. In 
[14], the authors propose a data model that characterizes the domain of computer 
attacks and intrusions as an ontology that covers concepts like (Host, System 
Component Attack, input, Consequence). Geneiatakis and Lambrinoudakis [15] 
propose an ontology for SIP-VoIP based services. This ontology can be applied 
either to find a countermeasure against attacks on SIP based VoIP services or for 
testing the security robustness of SIP-VoIP (Session Initial Protocol-VoIP) 
infrastructures.  
• Web oriented security ontologies:  
Denker et al in [16,17,18] develop several ontologies for security annotations of 
agents and web services, using DAML and later OWL.  The defined ontology is 
composed of two sub-ontologies: “security mechanisms” and “credential”. The 
NRL Security Ontology proposed in [19] is organised around seven separate 
ontologies. Artem Vorobiev and Jun Han proposed a security attack ontology for 
Web services [20].  
• Risk based security ontologies:  
Recent trends in security methodologies tend to consider that the best approach of 
security consists in starting from a risk analysis. Fenz et al. [3] proposed a 
security ontology framework based on four parts (the security and dependability 
taxonomy from [10], the underlying risk analysis methodology, the concepts of 
the IT infrastructure domain, and a simulation enabling enterprises to analyze 
various policy scenarios). Lenne et al. [21] proposed to develop a knowledge 
base containing ontologies for the analysis of industrial risks describing concepts 
used for the achievement of a risk analysis. 
•  (Security) Ontologies for Security requirements:  
Some papers refer to ontologies in order to cope with the definition of security 
requirements: Dobson and Sawyer [5] propose an ontology of dependability by 
merging two conceptualisation models (IFIP model & UMD model). Tsoumas et 
al. [22] define a security ontology using Asset, Stakeholder, Vulnerability, 
Countermeasure and Threat concepts. In [23] (Karyda et al.), the authors 
proposed an ontology formed of “assets” (data asset, hardware data, etc.), 
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 “countermeasures” (identification and authentication, network management, 
auditing services, physical protection, etc.), “objectives”, “persons” and “threats” 
(errors, attacks, technical failures, etc.). Firesmith [24] presents a taxonomy of 
security-related requirements (pure security requirements, security-significant 
requirements, security system requirements, security constraints). 
• Security modelling ontologies:  
Even if authors present them as ontologies, they mainly describe metamodels. 
While the previous ontologies include security specific concepts such as threat, 
attack, vulnerability, these ontologies include security related concepts for 
modelling requirements and the dependencies between them such as relationship, 
proposition, situation. Thus Mouratidis et al. [25] and Massacci et al. [26], 
proposed ontologies respectively associated with Tropos and i*.  
4 Discussion and evaluation 
In this section, we present the result of our comparison and evaluation of the 
ontologies by using a set of criteria  (security objectives, assets, vulnerabilities, 
threats, countermeasures and organisation). Security objective defines which security 
objective (accountability, confidentiality, integrity) are wished to be reached and can 
be affected by a certain threat. A threat is anything (manmade or act of nature) that 
has the potential to cause harm, it exploits a vulnerability. A vulnerability is 
considered as a property of the system or environment which, in conjunction with an 
attack, can lead to a failure. An asset is defined as something valuable in an 
organization. Assets are subject to attacks. The countermeasures are sets of actions 
implemented in prevention of the threat [27].   
 
Mylopoulos in [9] did not literally propose a security ontology, but a basic taxonomy 
composed of four sub-worlds. The authors note that users of Telos have developed 
models for the purpose of security specification but did not detail the underlying 
models. Avizienis et al. [10] fail to cover techniques for protecting confidentiality and 
establishing authenticity. The taxonomy was not used for requirements definition.  
The main limit in the taxonomy of McDermott et al. [11] is that it is too basic, 
focused on some flaws in operating systems only, far from many kinds of security 
flaws that might occur in application programs for database management, electronic 
mail, and so on.  The two general security ontologies of Herzog et al.[12] and Fenz et 
al. [13] are both interesting contributions but neither of them is complete. While the 
first one seems simple and clearer, the second is much richer but more complex. Fenz 
et al. cover better asset concepts, while Herzog et al. are better focused on threat 
concepts. Fenz's main contribution consist of the organisation concepts, clearly absent 
from Herzog. Herzog's countermeasures tend to be technical whereas Fenz's are both 
business and technical. The advantage of these ontologies of being generic and 
capturing most security criteria leads also to drawbacks since they lack in specificity 
that the domain dedicated security ontologies provide, and vice-versa.  Neither [12] 
nor [13] ontologies were used for requirements definition and analysis. The general 
ontologies offer generic concepts of security objectives, assets, vulnerabilities, 
 ♦ A Security Ontology 
♦ A Security Ontology 
countermeasures, threats, etc. while the rest offers more specific threats concepts 
(computer attacks and intrusions in [14], for example). The web oriented security 
ontologies do not cover some aspects like vulnerabilities or threats. Nevertheless, Kim 
et al. [19] proposed a matching algorithm that facilitates mapping of higher level 
(mission-level) security requirements to lower-level (resource level) capabilities using 
the ontology. In a very similar previous work by Denker et al. [16,17,18], the 
proposed ontology fails to consider vulnerabilities, assets and threats; but a reasoning 
engine matches between the request requirements and the capabilities of a potential 
web service. The risk based security ontologies of Fenz et al. [3] and Lenne et al. [21] 
could be useful for a risk based requirement analysis. However, to the best of our 
knowledge, there are no propositions combining both sides. In the context of 
requirements engineering some ontologies were proposed, but unfortunately none of 
them is associated to a methodology describing how to use them for requirement 
definition. Dobson and Sawyer's ontology [5] concentrates on few threat concepts. 
Tsoumas et al. [22] don't indicate any detailed mechanism on how to use the ontology 
for requirement collection. Finally, the security modelling ontologies, which are more 
security modelling oriented might be useful for constructing security requirements 
models like Secure i*. 
 
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2. Using security ontologies for requirement definition.  
 
We summarise this analysis and evaluation in Table 1. The rows are the security 
ontologies. The columns are the security concepts (criteria of the study: objectives, 
assets, vulnerabilities, threats, countermeasures and organisation). The last column in 
the table evaluates the link between the ontology and requirements definition. A black 
dot measures to which extent the security ontology covers this specific criterion, and 
how this particular security ontology deals with requirements. We used a dash for 
absence of use and a black square to indicate that technical aspects of security were 
addressed, as follows: (-: absent ●: very few  ●●: few  ●●●: much   ●●●●: very much   
ڦ: Technical ). To complete the study we drew up a graph that represent roughly, for 
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 each security ontology, how much it deals with requirements (x-axis) and how much 
it covers security concepts (y-axis). The graph in Figure 2 clearly reveals a gap 
between the two  fields. There is not a perfect ontology that covers lots of security 
aspects and, at the same time, that can be used in the definition for security 
requirements. 
5  Related works  
 
 While many security ontologies have been proposed, few surveys have been 
attempted. The only ones we can cite here are [1], [27], and recently [28] who 
proposed a survey of general ontologies for information systems encompassing some 
security ontologies. Blanco et al. [1] contains an interesting review and comparison of 
security ontologies that helped us in our study. However, since 2009 other ontologies 
have been proposed, indicating a need for updating. Moreover, Blanco et al. 
organized the existing ontologies under four categories. Our aim was to extend this 
classification and to update their surveys with recent literature contributions. 
 
6 Conclusion and perspectives  
 
This study has shown the existence of  considerable work around security ontologies; 
We classified the proposed ontologies into eight families. This classification extends 
the previous works which were limited to two, three, or four families at best.  Our 
analysis has also shown that the existing security ontologies vary a lot in the way they 
cover security aspects. We tried to analyse how each ontology covers each aspect of 
security which formed our criteria of the analysis. Moreover, we studied whether the 
proposed security ontology can be used for requirements  definition and the degree of 
this use. The study revealed a real gap between the fields of security requirement 
engineering and ontologies, and thus a new area of research to explore. We believe 
that this work can be improved; the classification needs to be extended. We also 
believe that there are still important issues to be addressed in the adaptation of 
ontology-based requirements engineering techniques to security requirements 
Engineering. This paper allows us to assert that the challenges facing software 
security is the lack of an easily accessible large common body of security knowledge. 
It remains difficult for designers to extract relevant pieces of knowledge to apply to 
their specific design or requirements related decision making situations. Our objective 
for the next steps of our research is to explore  the best use of these security 
ontologies for security requirement definition. 
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 Table 1.  Summary of security ontologies of the study 
 
 
1 How does the ontology cover this concept of security ?                                    - : absent  ●: very few    ●●: few  ●●●: much     ●●●●: very much  
2 How does this security ontology deal with requirements (last column)?                                                  Does this ontology refer to technical security concepts?   ڦ: Technical 
Family Security ontology  Security Objectives1 Assets1 Vulnerabilities1 Threats1  Counter-
measures1 
Organisation1 Requirements2
 
Beginning Mylopoulos et al.  
[9] 
- 
 
- - - - ● ● 
Avizienis  et al. 
[10] ●●● 
- - ●● ●●●● - - Security 
Taxonomies  
McDermott et  al. [11] - - - ●●●●ڦ - - - 
Herzog  et al. [12] ●● ●●●ڦ ●● ●●●ڦ ●●●ڦ ●● -  
General Fenz et al. (a)[13] ●●●● ●● ●●●● ●●●● ●●●● ●●●● - 
Undercoffer et al. [14] 
 
- ●ڦ ●ڦ ●●ڦ - - - Specific  
Geneiatakis et al. [15] ●● - - ●●●ڦ - - - 
Risk based Fenz et al. (b)[3] 
 
●● - - ●●●● ڦ ●●● ●●● - 
Denker et al. 
[16] [17] [18] 
 
●●● 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
 
●●ڦ 
 
- 
 
●● 
Kim et al. [19] 
 
●●●● - - - ●●●ڦ - ●● 
Web oriented  
Han et al. [20]   
 
- - - ●●●●ڦ - - - 
Dobson et al.[5] ●● - - ●● - - - 
Tsoumas et al.[22] - ●●● ●●● ●● ●●● ● ● 
Karyda et al. [23] ●● ●●● - ●●● ● ●● ● 
For security 
requirements  
 
 
Firesmith [24] - ●  -  ● -  -  ●●● 
Mouratidis et 
al.[25] ● 
- - - - ● ●●● Modelling  
 
 Massacci et al. [26] ●● ●● - ● - - ●●● 
